Security
Last updated 8 November 2026
This page describes how the Peripatetical platform — the shared sign-in, database and hosting that CloudMonitor runs on — protects the data you give it. It is written to be checkable rather than reassuring: everything below is either in place today or explicitly named as not in place.
If you only read one paragraph: this is a small, carefully built platform run by two people. The security work is real and deliberate, but it is sized for a service that is not yet handling anyone's production secrets at scale. Where that shows, this page says so.
How your account is protected
Sign-in
All sign-in goes through one central identity service rather than each product keeping its own passwords. In practice that means:
- No password for you to lose. Sign-in is by single-use email link or by your existing organizational account. There is no password database to breach, because there are no passwords.
- Sessions are short and out of reach of scripts. The shared sign-in session is a signed token in a cookie that page scripts cannot read (HttpOnly, Secure), and it expires after eight hours. Signing out at the central service signs you out of every product. CloudMonitor additionally keeps its own session server-side, so your browser holds only a reference to it.
Where your data sits
- The database is not on the public internet. Public network access is switched off entirely. Applications reach it over a private network path; there is no internet-facing address to attack, and no firewall rule that opens one. This is a standing rule, not a current setting — a service that cannot reach the database gets its networking fixed rather than the database exposed.
- Everything is encrypted in transit (HTTPS/TLS to the site, private networking inside) and at rest (managed disk encryption on the database and file storage).
- Credentials are stored in a managed secret vault, and applications read them using their own machine identity. Nobody carries a copy on a laptop.
- Cloud credentials you connect to CloudMonitor are encrypted with a dedicated key before they are stored, separately from everything else.
Who can see it
- Administrative access is limited to the operator, and reaching an administrative page requires a role that is granted explicitly — not implied by having an account.
- Administrative pages are reachable only over an authenticated session, and every product enforces the role check itself rather than trusting the page it was reached from.
- Administrative access is recorded. Sign-ins, permission changes, denied access attempts, and any export of records are written to an append-only audit log. Nobody, including the operator, can edit or delete an entry through the application.
- That log is what makes an honest answer possible if something ever does go wrong. It exists so that “we don’t know what was accessed” is never the answer you get.
Payments
Payments are handled entirely by Stripe, which acts as merchant of record. Card numbers are never sent to, processed by, or stored on Peripatetical systems — there is no payment form in this codebase to leak them from.
How the platform is maintained
- Dependencies are scanned automatically for known vulnerabilities, and security patches are proposed automatically.
- Every code change goes through review and automated checks before it can reach production. Nobody can push directly to a production branch — that restriction applies to the operator too, and cannot be bypassed.
- Commit history is scanned for leaked credentials on every change to every repository.
- Cloud configuration is continuously assessed against Microsoft's security baseline, so a misconfiguration surfaces rather than sitting unnoticed.
- Database backups are taken continuously with point-in-time restore, kept for 35 days, and copied to a second region. In addition, every hour the service is running, an encrypted copy of each database goes to a second provider, Google Cloud, in the United States; a copy is restored and checked every day.
What is deliberately not in place
Every service has gaps. Most security pages omit theirs. Here are the ones that would matter to you, and why they are where they are:
- There is no 24/7 monitored intrusion detection. Nothing watches traffic for attacks in real time and pages a human at 3am. Suspicious activity is recorded and reviewed, not alerted on. If you need continuously-monitored infrastructure today, this is not that yet.
- There has been no third-party penetration test or security audit. No SOC 2 report, no ISO 27001 certificate. Anyone claiming otherwise about this platform is wrong.
- Switching to the standby is not automatic yet. Until paid plans open, an outage alerts a person, who makes the switch; it becomes automatic when the first paying customer arrives. Before then, expect a longer outage than the targets below.
- Application logs are retained for 30 days. An incident discovered after that window would be harder to reconstruct in detail — though the audit log above is retained far longer.
- This is two people, not a team. There is no security team and no on-call rotation. A family member has administrative access as a backup for the owner, but neither of us is on call around the clock, so response time depends on someone being available.
These are cost and scale decisions, not oversights, and each is written down and tracked. They are reviewed as the services grow — but you are entitled to know the state today rather than the intention.
What is being built right now
Listing this separately rather than describing it as done, because as of the date at the top of this page it is written and reviewed but not yet running in production:
- Rate limiting on sign-in and account-recovery requests, to stop an automated script working through addresses. The limiter is written and deployed but is not yet applied to those endpoints.
This section shrinks as each item ships, and the date above moves when it does.
If our hosting provider goes down
The services run on Microsoft Azure. A standby is kept ready on a second provider, Google Cloud, in the United States, so a serious Azure outage — a whole region, or our account with Azure — does not mean waiting for Azure to recover. This is what you would see:
- Detection. A check that runs outside both providers notices within 15 minutes when Azure stops answering. Planned maintenance is not mistaken for an outage.
- The switch. The standby starts from the latest copy of the data and traffic moves to it at the same addresses; you do not need to change anything. The aim is to be serving again within about 45 minutes of the outage starting.
- What could be lost. Copies are taken every hour, so changes made in the hour before the outage may be missing on the standby. If they matter, you may need to make them again.
- While on the standby. Your account and your data work as usual, though you may be asked to sign in again. CloudMonitor’s scheduled scans and alerts pause until we are back on Azure, then resume on their normal schedule.
- Coming back. Moving back to Azure is planned, never automatic. For a short time, usually under an hour, the apps show a “we’ll be right back” page while the data is copied back. Nothing written on the standby is lost.
- Being told. A notice appears in the products while it happens.
These are targets, not a service level agreement: none is offered yet. The switch is rehearsed regularly; the date above moves when what you would see changes.
If something goes wrong
If personal data is ever compromised, the commitment is specific rather than vague:
- Affected people are contacted directly, not informed by a quietly updated web page.
- Notification follows the legal deadlines that apply — including the 72-hour reporting window under GDPR where it is engaged.
- You will be told what was actually accessed, established from the audit log rather than from a worst-case guess or a reassuring one.
- Nothing will be claimed as unaffected until that is a finding rather than a hope.
Reporting a vulnerability
If you find a security problem, please report it through the support form and say clearly in the message that it is a security issue — that routes it straight to the operator.
Please give a reasonable window to fix it before disclosing publicly. Good-faith research is welcome, and reports are read by a person, not a queue. What is asked in return: do not access, modify, or delete data that is not yours, do not degrade the service for other people, and do not use automated scanning heavy enough to look like an attack.
There is no paid bug bounty. This is a pre-revenue project and pretending otherwise would waste your time.
Changes to this page
If a control described here is turned off or materially changed, this page changes with it and the date above moves. It is meant to describe the service as it actually is, not as it was intended to be at launch.